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FEATURE ARTICLE

POINT OF VIEW

How should novelty be valued
in science?
Abstract Scientists are under increasing pressure to do "novel" research. Here I explore whether
there are risks to overemphasizing novelty when deciding what constitutes good science. I review
studies from the philosophy of science to help understand how important an explicit emphasis on
novelty might be for scientific progress. I also review studies from the sociology of science to
anticipate how emphasizing novelty might impact the structure and function of the scientific
community. I conclude that placing too much value on novelty could have counterproductive effects
on both the rate of progress in science and the organization of the scientific community. I finish by
recommending that our current emphasis on novelty be replaced by a renewed emphasis on
predictive power as a characteristic of good science.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.28699.001
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“(T)he primary novelty of this work is the ability
to make a prediction about drug sensitivity.
Reviewers felt that the predictive ability would
be very hard to generalize, however, reducing
the impact of this novel feature. This concern
about novelty. . . was the driving factor in this
decision.”
-excerpt from a rejection letter received by
the author
A mere 48 years separates the discovery of
the double-helix structure of DNA (Watson and
Crick, 1953) from the announcements that the
human
genome
had
been
sequenced
(Lander et al., 2001; Venter et al., 2001). The
pace and regularity with which important discoveries have been made in molecular biology is
remarkable. Molecular biologists have had an
uncanny knack of homing in on the small irregularities that lead to large breakthroughs. It was
irregularly colored ears of corn that revealed the
existence of mobile genetic elements known as
transposons (McClintock, 1950). Many of the
most important regulators of human development first surfaced as mutations that slightly
alter the rows of bristles on the undersides of
fruit fly larvae (Nüsslein-Volhard and Wieschaus, 1980). Scientists studying tiny roundworms that age in odd ways helped uncover
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micro RNAs (Lee et al., 1993; Wightman et al.,
1993), which are now thought to regulate a
large fraction of human genes. Again and again
molecular biologists have seized on these sorts
of minutiae to gain enormous insight into the
inner workings of cells. Looking back over the
last 60 years one feels a great sense of pride in
being part of a tradition that is undoubtedly one
of the most productive in the history of science.
Given the winning formula molecular biologists appear to have hit on, it is interesting that
there are large changes occurring in our community. As the size of the molecular biology community continues to grow, competition for limited
funding has become much more intense. With
the completion of the human genome has come
immense pressure to “translate” basic research
findings into new treatments for disease. In the
United States our institutional leaders at the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) openly worry
about data showing that the rate of discovery in
the biomedical sciences no longer reflects the
size of their investments (Cook et al., 2015;
Fortin and Currie, 2013; Gallo et al., 2014;
Lauer et al., 2015; Doyle et al., 2015). Undoubtedly these pressures influence the trajectories of
research programs. What we do not know yet is
how these pressures impact the overall productivity of our community.
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One manifestation of these changes is an
increasing emphasis on “novelty” in science. Our
scientific establishment – through our funding
agencies, review panels and editorial boards –
are clearly putting a higher and higher premium
on research that is deemed novel. Research programs that lack a “high degree” of novelty
struggle for support and “incremental” findings
are relegated to publication in second- and
third-tier journals. NIH grant proposals now have
an “Innovation” section where investigators
must explicitly list the attributes of their research
that make it novel. While funding agencies seek
novelty in their grant portfolios, they are also
increasingly looking for "feasibility" as resources
become scarce, and this appears to put novel
research
programs
at
a
disadvantage
(Alberts et al., 2014). As investigators struggle
to walk a nearly impossible line between feasibility and novelty, the definition of novelty itself
becomes blurred. Novelty can now mean anything from demonstrating a well-established
phenomenon in a new system to testing a
hypothesis with no precedent in the literature.
Even though we cannot strictly define what is
and is not novel, the message is still clear; novelty equates with good research.
Perhaps this emphasis on novelty is not really
new at all, but only a codifying of something we
already value implicitly. Even so, we should consider the effects that an explicit emphasis on
novelty might have on the properties of scientific
research that have made molecular biology so
successful. These properties include our system
of peer review, our scientific standards of proof
and falsification, and the organization of the scientific community. Increasing the value we place
on novelty will likely affect each of these factors.

It appears then that nothing in the
ideas of Popper or Kuhn particularly
values novelty for its own sake.

Lessons from the philosophy of
science
For working scientists Karl Popper is almost certainly the most influential philosopher of science.
Most of us at least pay lip service to Popper’s
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philosophy when we recite the mantra that
hypotheses can never be proved, only disproved. For many scientists the distinction
between what is disprovable and what is not
demarcates the line between what is and is not
science, an idea taken directly from Popper’s
writings. According to Popper, scientists propose new hypotheses about how the world
works, and any hypotheses that are subsequently falsified by empirical observation are relegated to the scrap heap (Popper, 1963). This
framework of hypothesis generation and refutation is widely accepted by scientists.
What is less well appreciated is how utterly
Popper rejected the notion of confirmation.
Popper was adamant that the survival of a
hypothesis in the face of empirical challenge
says nothing about its validity, only that that the
hypothesis has yet to be falsified. However, Popper’s strict adherence to this idea became difficult to defend and, to be practical, most
scientists do allow that empirical evidence can
either support or falsify a hypothesis.
What if anything can we infer about the value
of novelty from Popper’s ideas on hypotheses
and falsification? Because Popper believed that
hypotheses can never be proved, he stressed
that hypotheses must be subjected to repeated
testing, even after they have survived several
empirical challenges. In this sense he valued follow-through over novelty. However, because
Popper believed that “good tests kill flawed theories”, new tests must be more than trivial variations of previous experiments. The philosopher
Imre Lakatos argued that good research programs are "progressive" (Lakatos, 1970), and
that scientists should constantly seek to expand
their hypotheses into new areas of observation.
Today, however, review panels are likely to tag
progressive research programs as lacking in novelty because the scientists who pursue these
programs seek to expand old hypotheses into
new realms, rather than develop new hypotheses altogether. This is misguided. Scientists following progressive research programs require
ingenuity and creativity to devise the tests that
expand the reach of their hypotheses beyond
the obvious. According to Popper the novelty of
a new hypothesis is beside the point, unless and
until the hypothesis it is meant to replace is
falsified.
Thomas Kuhn, a contemporary of Popper,
was in many ways Popper’s opposite. Kuhn
emphasized the importance of “paradigms”,
coherent collections of claims, methodologies,
and teaching practices that govern scientific
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inquiry. In his hugely influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions he explains that the
purpose of a paradigm is to provide a guide for
investigating the right questions (Kuhn and
Hacking, 2012). Here Kuhn’s philosophy sharply
contrasts with Popper’s. While Popper advocated abandoning a theory the moment it was
falsified, Kuhn emphasized that paradigms can
tolerate a good deal of “anomalies” and still
remain valid. The flexibility of paradigms allows
scientists to continue working in a productive
framework long after falsification would have
dictated a change. If scientists had to drop their
paradigms every time they encountered a problem then nothing would ever get done. Only a
critical mass of anomalies requires a “paradigm
shift”.
It appears then that nothing in the ideas of
Popper or Kuhn particularly values novelty for its
own sake. Both Popper and Kuhn emphasized
the need for scientists to stick doggedly with
their hypotheses, Popper because hypotheses
must be challenged continually no matter how
often they have been confirmed, and Kuhn
because only a critical mass of anomalies can
force a paradigm shift. Ironically, over time the
effect of Kuhn’s book has been to weaken scientists’ belief in their paradigms. Many investigators now actively search for paradigm shifts. This
conflicts with Kuhn’s description of progress in
which scientists cling tightly to their paradigms,
giving them up only grudgingly after the weight
of anomalous results renders the paradigm
unsupportable. Despite their differences, novelty
seeking is not a key component in the philosophies of either Popper or Kuhn.
Many scientists have a visceral reaction to
philosophies that cast them as mechanically pursuing their hypotheses. Kuhn in particular was
attacked for seeming to endorse a grinding and
boring type of science, and he did not help his
case by referring to work done in the context of
a paradigm as “normal” science.
But we need not explicitly value novelty to
keep science from being a dull grind. Peter Godfrey-Smith writes that Popper painted an appealing picture of scientists as “hard-headed
cowboys, out on the range, with a Stradivarius
tucked in their saddlebags” (GodfreySmith, 2003). Hard-headed because they must
have the determination to stick with their
hypotheses, and packing a Stradivarius because
they need inspiration when devising tests that
expand their hypotheses into new realms. Kuhn
too seemed in awe of the ability of normal science to hone in on “miniscule” findings that end
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up revealing deep truths about the world. Think
of the little tails on the electron micrographs of
the RNA:DNA hybrids that revealed the phenomenon of intron splicing (Berget et al.,
1977), or the examples given at the start of this
article. While normal science might seem a
derogatory term for what most investigators do,
Kuhn saw it as requiring imagination.
Even still, as working scientists we know that
much of day-to-day science involves painstaking
and often repetitive work. Science succeeds
because powerful social incentives help us push
through the less glamorous aspects of research.
Godfrey-Smith writes that the most significant
reactions to the philosophies of both Popper
and Kuhn emphasized the importance of social
forces in science. For example, in his later writings Popper struggled with the question of
exactly when an observation counts as a refutation. His solution was to shift from describing
the proper methodologies of science to describing the proper social behavior of scientists. For
Kuhn, paradigms highlighted the importance of
the social aspects of science, including the
indoctrination of students and the collective
adherence to particular claims among investigators working under the same paradigm. In the
next section I discuss how the increasing emphasis on novelty might influence the social structure of science.

Lessons from the sociology of
science
An important question for sociologists of science
– and also for scientists and funding agencies –
is: What distribution of people across rival
research programs is best for science? The
immediate impact of emphasizing novelty might
be to distribute researchers over the widest possible range of research programs, as each investigator seeks to maximize the novelty of their
own research program. This might seem an efficient way of exploring the widest possible range
of theories but such a distribution also raises
problems. Kuhn wrote extensively of the necessity of having large groups of researchers organized around a particular set of theories. Placing
too much emphasis on novelty may result in a
distribution of effort that is too diffuse to enable
efficient progress. But scientists consider an
array of incentives besides novelty when choosing their research programs.
Robert Merton laid the foundations of the
sociology of science with his discussion of
reward systems in science (Merton, 1957).
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Merton argued that recognition is the main form
of reward in science. In particular the “priority
rule”, which awards the most recognition to the
first investigator to support a hypothesis, is an
especially powerful incentive in science. To support his idea Merton showed that the history of
science is chock full of disputes over priority (for
example, Isaac Newton battled Gottfried Leibniz
over priority for the invention of calculus
(Hall, 1980)). One benefit of an incentive system
that rewards priority is that it encourages original thought and novel lines of investigation. One
might argue that this means that novelty seeking
is already baked directly into the social fabric of
science.

Hull viewed the success of science
as a result of a delicate balance
between competition and
cooperation, creativity and
skepticism, trust and doubt, and
open-mindedness and dogmatism.
Placing too much emphasis on
novelty could upset this equilibrium
in ways that are not optimal for
scientific progress.

Some sociologists argue that the priority
incentive coupled with the individual quest for
credit is what produces good outcomes in the
scientific community. These authors envision
something like the “invisible hand” that guides
free market capitalism in Adam Smith’s Wealth
of Nations (Smith, 2000). Scientists must balance risk versus reward when choosing between
competing hypotheses to explore. The priority
incentive prevents all investigators from working
on the hypothesis with the highest probability of
success. The argument is that credit is a pie of
fixed size that can be shared either equally
(Kitcher, 1990) or unequally (Strevens, 2003),
but only by investigators who work on the winning hypothesis. When too many scientists work
on the same hypothesis there is an incentive to
work on novel hypotheses, even ones where the
chance of success might be smaller, but where
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the share of credit would be larger (Laudan, 1977). In this way the priority rule balances
cooperation and competition between scientists,
and divides individual effort between different
research programs.
David Hull argued that science is particularly
good at portioning effort in a way that maximizes good outcomes for the community
(Hull, 1988). Hull agreed with Merton that the
priority rule helps to maintain a balance between
cooperation and competition in science. However, he also recognized the importance of the
rivalries between scientists that encourage investigators to check the validity of their competitors’ work, especially results they may want to
use in their own research. This checking, along
with the priority rule, helps to maintain a balance between creativity and skepticism, which
Hull believed was an essential feature of science.
Scientists can become overly attached to their
ideas, and most are reluctant to kill their pet
theories, especially theories with creative
panache. To counterbalance this tendency science relies on the incentive rival scientists have
to vigorously check work that may be useful to
them, or results that challenge their own
dogma.
Hull might have been wary about introducing
an explicit incentive for novelty into the scientific
community. For one thing, along with most
other sociologists of science, he thought that
the priority incentive already provided a powerful motivation for scientists to test novel theories. But more than others Hull viewed the
success of science as a result of a delicate balance between competition and cooperation,
creativity and skepticism, trust and doubt, and
open-mindedness and dogmatism. Placing too
much emphasis on novelty could upset this equilibrium in ways that are not optimal for scientific
progress.
In particular, an explicit emphasis on novelty
might perturb the balance between the incentive for scientists to check their rivals’ theories
and the priority rule. The priority rule provides a
powerful incentive for scientists to publish their
work quickly. This is good for the community
because new ideas get disseminated rapidly,
where they can be incorporated into other
research programs. However, there is an equally
powerful incentive to be correct when publishing
because scientists know that other investigators
who want to build on their results are likely to
uncover any mistakes that make it into print. If
we value novelty too much then scientists will be
incentivized to publish too quickly, without
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imposing the rigor they might normally demand
of themselves. Progress would slow to a crawl as
other scientists waste time trying to build on
flawed results.
Indeed, some in the scientific establishment
have already warned of a “crisis in reproducibility” (Errington et al., 2014; Baker, 2016). Not
surprisingly this crisis follows an explosion in
papers reporting weak claims of novelty
(Henikoff and Levis, 1991; Friedman and Karlsson, 1997). Others have argued that the reward
system in modern molecular biology incentivizes
statistically underpowered research designs
(Higginson and Munafò, 2016). To counteract
this trend some of the leaders in our field now
advocate funding centralized efforts to validate
published studies (Collins and Tabak, 2014).
This suggests that priority and checking have
become unbalanced in the general scientific
community. Those leaders advocating for centralized checking efforts might do well to ask
themselves what role their emphasis on novelty
has played in precipitating this so-called crisis.
Another consequence of emphasizing novelty
might be to increase the tenacity with which scientists attack their rivals’ hypotheses. Novel
results are particularly likely to be attacked, in
part because scientists who can lay claim to novelty enjoy so many advantages over other scientists. Rival scientists are thus incentivized to use
anomalous results to discredit novel hypotheses.
This is unfortunate because as Kuhn emphasized,
hypotheses must be allowed to tolerate some
anomalous results before they are discarded,
otherwise the community cannot exploit the utility of working models. Ironically, novel research
programs have a very difficult time surviving
when novelty is so highly coveted.

Perhaps our obsession with novelty
is a sort of communal nostalgia for
the good old days, when important
foundational discoveries came fast
and furious.

An emphasis on novelty could also break the
cohesion between scientists working within
research programs. Cooperation is essential to
scientific progress, and this cooperation is
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balanced by competition from investigators who
are willing to challenge rival theories. If scientists
must maximize the novelty of their research then
they are more likely to pursue avenues as different as possible from their colleagues. We risk
producing a community in which no single paradigm has the critical mass of supporters required
to function effectively. This is a serious problem
because current paradigms, imperfect though
they might be, often have great utility, even
though they may eventually be revised or even
discarded.

Conclusions
When an area of science experiences rapid
advancement over a short interval of time it may
be followed by a period in which novel discoveries are harder to come by. After Mendeleyev
articulated the concept of the periodic table
there was an exciting period in which novel elements were rapidly discovered. As time passed
it became more and more difficult to isolate the
remaining elements. Perhaps molecular biology
is also in a lull after a period of virtually unprecedented achievement. Almost 50 years ago Gunther Stent argued that there were no new
principles left to discover in molecular biology
(Stent, 1969). All that scientists could look forward to would be the tedious grind of filling in
details. These sorts of pronouncements have a
way of being undone by events. For example,
Stent’s prediction came before the discovery of
splicing, reverse transcription, and micro RNAs.
Even so, it may well be true that most of the
foundational principles of molecular biology
have already been discovered. Perhaps our
obsession with novelty is a sort of communal
nostalgia for the good old days, when important
foundational discoveries came fast and furious.
It might also be that our desire to reward
novelty stems from the frustration that research
in molecular biology is not “translating” into
new practical applications as fast as some might
wish. The endless overpromising of novel therapeutics from our institutional leaders only makes
this matter worse. Why don’t discoveries in
molecular biology translate more quickly into
practical applications? Is it because we are missing large chunks of basic theory? Probably not,
and those who go searching for novelty and paradigm shifts are likely to be disappointed.
Instead, we face a very different set of problems. While our models are generally quite good
at explaining the basic mechanisms underlying
molecular biology, it is also the case that most
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of our models lack a quantitative formulation.
Even when we know the underlying molecular
mechanisms at work in a given system or process, in most cases we lack the ability to make
quantitative predictions about the effects that
specific perturbations will have on that system or
process. We have a mountain of facts about how
transcription initiates and beautiful cartoon models of this process, but we cannot predict the
effects that genetic variants will have on transcription rates, whether these variants reside in
cis-acting DNA sequences or in trans-acting protein factors. We know the identities of virtually
all the proteins involved in apoptosis, and which
of their post-translational modifications are proor anti-apoptotic. Yet we cannot use quantitative
measures of the levels of these proteins in any
cell type to make an accurate prediction of
whether that cell will die or not. We understand
the principles that drive peptide sequences to
fold into secondary and tertiary structures, yet
we cannot predict the shape any given amino
acid sequence will adopt. Seen through the lens
of predictive power, it is clear that the vast
majority of models in molecular biology are
inadequate for solving real world problems.
If we want to solve important practical problems then progressive research programs that
expand and refine the predictive power of existing models are at least as important as research
programs focused on novel hypotheses. One
suggestion would be to replace the current
emphasis on novelty with an emphasis on predictive power, particularly quantitative predictions. Research that results in models that
reliably and quantitatively predict the outcomes
of genetic, biochemical, or pharmacological perturbations should be valued highly, and
rewarded, regardless of whether such models
invoke novel phenomena.
The increasing emphasis placed on novelty
brings significant dangers. As it becomes more
and more important for scientists to be “the first
to demonstrate” some claim, the influence of
the priority rule will increase and more scientists
will feel pressure to sacrifice rigor for speed of
publication. We are also likely to see an increase
in distasteful disputes over priority. The cohesion between competing groups may also be in
jeopardy as the drive for novelty distorts the balance between competition and cooperation that
has characterized the success of molecular biology over the past several decades.
Science as we practice it today is a relatively
recent development. Our system of peer review,
the priority rule, and the organization of
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scientists into cooperative social demes that
compete against other groups of scientists all
trace their origin to decisions made by the Royal
Society in the late 1600s. For most of history
humans acquired knowledge outside of what we
would recognize as a scientific framework. It
would be unwise to assume that science is a permanent feature of our society or that it can withstand deep structural changes and remain an
efficient engine of discovery. The explicit value
we now place on novelty in molecular biology is
a change we should approach with caution if we
are to safeguard the essential features of science
that have made our field so successful.
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